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Abstract. In this paper we describe the IAMwildCAT agent, de-
signed for the TAC Market Design game which is part of the In-
ternational Trading Agent Competition. The objective of an agent
in this competition is to effectively manage and operate a market
that attracts traders to compete for resources in it. This market, in
turn, competes against markets operated by other competition en-
trants and the aim is to maximise the market and proﬁt share of the
agent, as well as its transaction success rate. To do this, the agent
needs to continually monitor and adapt, in response to the compet-
ing marketplaces, the rules it uses to accept offers, clear the market,
price the transactions and charge the traders. Given this context, this
paper details IAMwildCAT’s strategic behaviour and describes the
wide techniques we developed to operationalise this. Finally, we em-
pirically analyse our agent in different environments, including the
2007 competition where it ranked ﬁrst.
1 Introduction
Continuous Double Auctions (CDAs) have traditionally been used in
stock markets in order to trade securities and other ﬁnancial com-
modities. Their attraction lies in the fact that any trader (buyer or
seller) can come into the market, at any point, and place a shout for
buying (resp. selling) at some desired price, and a trade will take
place almost instantly, if there is a matching offer to sell (resp. buy)
at that or a better price. Given this, most of the existing work on
CDAs addresses ways of designing effective strategies that maximize
a trader’s proﬁt. However, there is considerably less literature on the
design of market protocols for such auctions in order to promote de-
sirable properties (such as improved efﬁciency or reduced market
volatility). Moreover, in today’s globalised economy, stocks are often
traded simultaneously in different (competing) markets around the
world. Thus, the different markets need to differentiate themselves
and appeal to traders to conduct their business under their jurisdic-
tion (e.g. by offering attractive prices for participation and trading).
To rectify this shortcoming, the TAC Market Design Competition
(CAT) provides a test-bed for exploring the problem of designing
competitive and efﬁcient markets (see [3] for the competition rules).
Each CAT game lasts a number of days, and each day consists of
a number of trading rounds, which each lasts for a known constant
length of time. A number of traders and a number of markets partici-
pate (the former are determined by the competition organisers, while
thelatterarethecompetitionentrants).Eachtraderisgivenaﬁniteset
of goods to trade and is assigned a private value (also referred to as a
limit price) for each good. The difference between this price and the
transaction price represents the proﬁt of the agent in the transaction;
their total proﬁt in the market is the sum of these transaction prof-
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its minus any fees that they incur in participating in the market. The
traders use various well-known strategies from the CDA literature:
ZI, ZIP, GD, RE (Roth-Erev) [5, 1, 4, 6] and are allowed to regis-
ter with a different market at the beginning of each day. They also
have a memory of the proﬁt they achieved historically in each mar-
ket such that they are more likely to register to the market where they
made the highest proﬁt. Thus, the markets must compete for traders
by clearing transactions efﬁciently and not charging excessive fees.
The different competing markets are represented by specialists,
each of which is an agent entered by a separate competitor. These
specialists set the rules for their respective market; they determine
which shouts are accepted in the market (quote-accepting rule),
which shouts will be matched for transactions (clearing rule) and
at what price (pricing rule), as well as the fees to charge for various
services (charging policy).
The score of each agent is a combination of three different met-
rics: the proﬁt obtained as a percentage of the total proﬁt obtained by
all specialists, the market share of the agent (i.e. the percentage of
traders who register with the specialist), and the transaction success
rate (TSR) (i.e. the percentage of shouts accepted by the market that
resulted in a transaction). To be successful, therefore, an agent needs
to be competitive in making proﬁt, attracting traders and ensuring
that shouts placed in the market result in transactions. While these
goals are not necessarily contrary to each other, there are a number of
trade-offs to be resolved here. For example, charging larger fees will
increase the proﬁt but decrease the market share, while improving the
TSR by accepting fewer shouts will result in fewer total transactions
and thus less proﬁt both for the specialist and the traders.
Inordertodesignaneffectivespecialistagent,wedecidedtobreak
the agent down to multiple components, where each one deals with a
particular trade-off. Then looking at each component, we designed it
in such a way as to balance that trade-off. For example, we designed
a clearing rule that allows us to maximize the TSR with a minimal
drop in the efﬁciency of the transactions, and a pricing policy, that
manages to extract enough proﬁt without compromising the agent’s
market share. Similar methods, of breaking down a complex problem
into multiple parts and then selecting strategies for and optimizing
each one separately, have successfully been used in other complex
trading domains [9]. Drawing inspiration from this approach, we also
started testing the various individual components using experimental
comparisons. The goals of these experiments are two-fold: to deter-
mine the best possible agent design, and to examine the behaviour of
the market and how it is affected by the different strategies.
Against this background, in this paper we make the following con-
tributions. First, we describe, for the ﬁrst time, the various policies of
our agent. We explain how the various trade-offs guided the design
of the agent and how each one was addressed, in order to gener-
ate the most competent and successful agent that participated in thecompetition. Thus, we designed a number of novel strategies, e.g.
clearing shouts, in some rounds, to maximise the number of transac-
tions cleared rather than the proﬁt. Second, we experimentally eval-
uate the performance of our agent. We compare the efﬁciency and
performance of our agent against that of the other competitors in the
competition. Here we show that our agent achieved the best and most
stable performance, both in the score and across other metrics (i.e. at-
tracting “good” traders and maintaining a high market efﬁciency).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a com-
plete description of our agent and all its components. In Section 3,
we present the experiments we conducted. Then, we conclude.
2 The IAMwildCAT Strategy
Given this background on the CAT game and its goals, our objective
is to design an agent that maximises the scoring function. Speciﬁ-
cally, our strategy consists of a set of different market rules and the
charging policy (see Figure 1). Each of these policies involves a par-
ticular trade-off; in the rest of this section, we detail how we designed
the agent in order to resolve each trade-off.
Figure 1. Structure of the IAMwildCAT Strategy
2.1 The Quote-Accepting Rule
We ﬁrst consider the quote-accepting rule which selects the bids and
asks that are accepted into the market (i.e. not all bids submitted by
the traders will necessarily be accepted into the marketplace). Such
rules are typically employed to speed up the bidding process (e.g. the
NYSE quote-accepting rule [10] speciﬁes that any new quote must
improve upon the currently outstanding quote), as well as to improve
the properties of the auction (e.g. reducing price ﬂuctuations [8]). In
the CAT platform, because TSR is a measure of success, it is impor-
tant to reject the “poor” bids and asks that the market does not expect
to clear. Now, we could maximise the TSR by accepting only a few
really “good” shouts. However, the fewer shouts that are accepted,
the smaller the number of transactions and thus the smaller the proﬁt
of both agents and traders; it also makes the market less attractive to
traders, which impacts the market share. Thus, we need to select just
the right shouts in order to balance this trade-off.
The micro-economic theory of competitive equilibrium states that
transaction prices are expected to converge to the competitive equi-
librium price p
 where demand meets supply [2]. Thus, we expect
the bids (resp. asks) that will be cleared in the market to be at least
as high (resp. low) as the competitive equilibrium price. The aim,
then, is to accept these bids and asks, rejecting those bids below and
those asks above this price. Now, because we can only estimate the
equilibrium based on the convergence of transaction prices, we as-
sume some error in our estimation and provide some slack, r and
a, when deciding the minimum bid, bidmin = (1   r)p
   a
or maximum ask, askmax = (1 + r)p
 + a to accept. We es-
timate the competitive equilibrium price using a weighted moving
average (giving more weight to more recent transactions because of
the expected convergence) that is reset at the end of each trading day.
Furthermore, because traders register with a specialist at the be-
ginning of each trading day, it is impossible to ensure that the same
set of traders will remain in the market. Thus we do not expect the
equilibrium price to remain constant across trading days. Given this,
we reset the moving average of the equilibrium price at the beginning
of each day. On the ﬁrst round, because of the high variance of trans-
action prices [10] and, hence, the poor estimate of the equilibrium
price, we set r to be proportional to the variance of the transaction
prices (for more slack at the beginning of the trading day).
In more detail, intra-marginal
2 traders are expected to trade earlier
than extra-marginal traders (as their better shouts are more likely to
be cleared ﬁrst) such that most of the proﬁtable transactions occur
earlier during the trading day, with the extra-marginal and marginal
traders left to bid at the end of the day. To avoid marginal bids and
asks (that are slightly lower and higher than the equilibrium price re-
spectively) being submitted and risking that they remain uncleared at
the end of the trading day, we further constrain our quote-accepting
rule. In particular, on the last few trading rounds, our strategy only
accepts bids and asks that can be currently cleared. Thus, we min-
imise the number of uncleared bids and asks, improving our TSR.
2.2 The Clearing Rule
The clearing rule deﬁnes when and how to clear the market. There
are two parts to this rule. The ﬁrst is when to clear. One approach is to
collect all bids and asks and clear the market at the end of the trading
daytomaximiseproﬁts.However,becausetradersbidforsingleunits
at a time, this approach would imply traders have the opportunity to
trade only a single unit (unable to trade the rest of their multi-unit
endowment). An alternative approach is to maximise the number of
transactions (instead of proﬁts) by a continuous clearing rule when-
ever a bid or an ask is accepted in the market (e.g. the Continuous
Double Auction clearing [10]). Given this, our strategy adopts a rule
in between these two approaches, with the market clearing at the end
of each round. In this way, we can be almost as efﬁcient as clearing
at the end of the day, while allowing the traders to still trade multiple




transactions, by matching “bad” shouts with “good” shouts, but in so
doing,itwillreducetheefﬁciencyofthemarketandgivelessaverage
proﬁt to the traders (which will have an impact on the market share
primarily). On the other hand, it can match the shouts efﬁciently,
and maximise proﬁts to the traders, but it will generate less trans-
actions (and TSR). As mentioned earlier, intra-marginal traders are
expected to trade earlier than marginal (and extra-marginal) traders
such that the amount of proﬁt to be extracted in the market is higher
earlier during the trading day, with less proﬁt to be made at the end
of the trading day. Thus we chose the following strategy to deal with
this trade-off: our agent clears the market for maximum proﬁts at the
end of the earlier rounds of the trading day, while, on the following
rounds, with less proﬁts to be made in the market, our agent clears
to maximise the number of transactions. By so doing, some extra-
marginal traders are allowed to transact while increasing the number
2 An intra-marginal buyer (resp. seller) is expected to trade in the market
because of its limit price is higher (resp. lower) than the equilibrium price.
The remaining traders are extra-marginal.of transactions and hence the TSR, at the expense of some proﬁts
(though these are generally low at this point).
2.3 The Pricing Rule
The pricing rule determines the price at which a transaction occurs
when a buyer and a seller are chosen to transact (by the clearing rule).
This price can have any value between the ask and bid prices. Ini-
tially, we used primarily discriminatory k-pricing
3 with k = 0:5; this
means that the mean of the ask and bid prices is chosen as the trans-
action price. In the competition, we used a variation of this policy,
called side-biased pricing, which varies k, depending on the num-
ber of buyers and sellers participating in the market. Speciﬁcally,
we looked at a window of the latest 10 trading days for the average
number of buyers and sellers our agent attracted, and if the differ-
ence between the number of buyers and sellers is bigger than 10%
of the total number of traders, we adjust k (proportionately to this
difference) in order to give more proﬁt to the side which is under
represented. We do this in an attempt to attract more of them. How-
ever, as we wanted to be somewhat conservative
4, we only allow k to
vary in k 2 [0:3;0:7]. In Section 3.3, we discuss this issue in more
detail and examine the preformance of the two policies.
2.4 The Charging Policy
The charging policy determines the speciﬁc charges that are levied
from the traders in the system. A registration fee is paid by traders
in order to register with the market agent at the beginning of the day,
irrespective of whether they transact or not. An information fee is
paid if transaction history information is obtained. A shout fee and
a transaction fee are the amount payed respectively when a shout is
placed and when a transaction occurs. The proﬁt fee is the percentage
ofthedifferencebetweentheacceptedshoutandthetransactionprice
that is paid by the traders to the market.
5 Before we describe our
policy in detail, it is necessary to note the ways in which an agent’s
charging policy changes its score:
 the score is increased each day by the percentage of the proﬁt
that the agent achieved compared to all agents; this means that
extracting proﬁt is most efﬁcient for small absolute values of the
proﬁt (compared to the total proﬁt extracted by everyone else).
 the market share is decreased by an amount which is relatively
proportional to the absolute value of the proﬁt that any agent ex-
tracts in total.
These two facts led us to design a charging policy that is mainly
trying to maintain a minimum amount of target market share, while
at the same time extracting the best possible score from the proﬁt,
without compromising the market share. More speciﬁcally, we use a
target proﬁt percentage charging policy, that during each day aims
to extract a predetermined proﬁt score. This target score depends on
the agent’s current market share MS. Speciﬁcally, our agent aims





M ], where M is the total number of competing
markets. Thus it tries to obtain a market share slightly higher than the
average market share that all markets have. We regulate our market
3 The value of k determines the difference of the transaction price from the
ask and bid prices.
4 In the CAT game, because traders consider their entire history of proﬁts
and some randomness introduced in the trader’s selection of the market to
trade in, the effect of giving more proﬁt to one side could be delayed; if we
are too aggressive, it might lead us to overshoot our goal of balancing the
populations of buyers and sellers and thus cause the behaviour to oscillate.
5 Note that if this is 100%, then the pricing rule does not matter at all, since
all the difference between the ask and bid prices is levied by the market.
share by getting more proﬁt than our opponents when our market
share is high, and less when our market share is below our target. We
thus distinguish between two states in this strategy:
 If MS < MStarget, then the market is in trader attraction mode
6
and we aim to extract a small proﬁt percentage equal to P% =
50%
M ; as this percentage is about half that of the average proﬁt
made by other agents, it will lead (all other things being equal) to
an increase of market share within some trading days.
 If MS > MStarget, then the market is in trader exploitation
mode
7 and we aim to extract a larger proﬁt percentage equal to
P% =
200%
M ; as this percentage is about twice that of the aver-
age proﬁt made by other agents it will lead (all other things being
equal) to a reasonable score, but at a cost of some market share
loss within the next trading days.
The target share MStarget is gradually decreased if trader attraction
mode lasts for more than 10 days and is increased for every day that
the agent is in trader exploitation mode.
In more detail, let , ,  and  be, respectively, the total op-
ponent proﬁt, the number of traders in our market, the number of
transactions and the average transaction proﬁt (measured as the dif-
ference between the ask and bid prices in each transaction), averaged
over the last few days. These average values are reasonable expec-
tations for these variables during the following day. Our agent target
proﬁt target is set to target = P%  . Therefore the average fee
paid by each trader must be
target
 . In trader attraction mode, we set
the registration fee equal to 75% of this value, while, in exploitation
mode,thisissetto50%.Theremainingproﬁtisextractedthroughthe
proﬁt fee by dividing the remainder by . If this value is more than
100%, then we set the proﬁt fee to 100% and gain the remaining
proﬁt by additionally setting a transaction fee equal to the remain-
ing proﬁt divided by . We don’t set an information nor a shout fee.
The reason for chosing to extract most of the proﬁt through the reg-
istration fee is because all traders, whether intra or extra-marginal,
pay this, while only successful (i.e. intra-marginal) traders pay the
other two. In this way, we also achieve the effect of attracting the
desirable, intra-marginal traders and driving away the undesirable,
extra-marginal traders.
A ﬁnal adjustment to this strategy is made to account for the be-
ginning and end of the game. As market share is more important at
the beginning and becomes progressively less so towards the end, we
try to build market share at the beginning, by not extracting any proﬁt
for a set number of days (set to 80), and increasing the target percent-
age during the last 100 days of the game, and in particular during the
last 40, when the increase becomes quite pronounced.
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3 Evaluation
In this section, we analyse the performance of our specialist against
other competitors entered in the CAT competition. To this end, we
adopt a similar experimental setup
9 as in the competition, with a
6 To avoid thrashing, we also count the number of trading days since we last
switched modes in the strategy; there is a minimum number of days since
the last switch before the next switch is allowed.
7 In fact we use this additional rule before we switch to this mode: we aim
to exploit when the total proﬁt made by the opponents drops below its his-
torical average (by a certain discount), as this will allow us to get more
score with less penalty to the market share. This discount is being adjusted
depending on the number of times that this rule succeeds or fails.
8 It should be noted that the length of the CAT game, during the competition,
was set to 500 days and each day had 10 rounds; these facts were common
knowledge and this allowed us to use this end game strategy.
9 Note that, in our experiments, we used all the available binaries of compe-
tition entrants, with the exception of Havana (because of the unavailability
of the CPLEX optimisation library they employ) and PSUCAT (because of
their unstable implementation).game
10 running over 500 trading days each lasting 10 trading rounds.
The trader population comprises of 180 ZIP traders, 180 RE traders,
20 ZI traders and 20 GD traders, equally split as buyers and sellers.
Each trader is endowed with 10 goods to buy or sell at a limit price
that is independently drawn from a uniform distribution between 50
and 150 such that the theoretical equilibrium price
11 is 100.
In particular, we ﬁrst analyse the competition results reported by
Nui et al. [7] in Subsection 3.1. Then, we analyse in detail the per-
formance of IAMwildCAT. Speciﬁcally, we consider the following
aspects that Nui et al. do not analyse. First, we look at how the num-
ber of globally intra-marginal
12 buyers and sellers compares over the
trading days (to analyse its effectiveness in attracting “good” traders)
in Subsection 3.2. Second, we look at our policy for side-biased pric-
ing in Subsection 3.3 and how it improved our market share and,
ﬁnally, we look at some more general experiments on the efﬁciency
ofour strategy inahomogeneousenvironment inSubsection3.4.The
purpose of this exercise is to observe its efﬁciency if all the agents
adopt the IAMwildCAT strategy. Note that in ﬁgures 2, 3 and 4 we
plot only the 5 best strategies for clarity.
3.1 The CAT Competition
Nui et al. reported the results of the 2007 CAT competition which
was won by IAMwildCAT, with the highest score (at 240.2) outper-
forming the second placed one by 13% and the third one by 25%
[7]. They also empirically evaluated all strategies to identify how
they perform in difference cases. They showed that IAMwildCAT
had the lowest standard deviation (at 2.8), which suggests consistent
behaviour over all the runs. Furthermore, they showed that IAMwild-
CAT had the highest market share and the highest TSR throughout
most of the games. We attribute the former to our strategic choice
of maximising market share at the beginning, sacriﬁcing all prof-
its. After 80 trading days, our agent starts charging the traders (see
Subsection 2.4) which gradually increases our proﬁt share. We typi-
cally expect its market share to decrease (as traders are less proﬁtable
in its market). However, by adapting its charging policy effectively,
IAMwildCAT does not compromise its market share and, indeed, it
is able to increase its proﬁt share while sustaining its market share.
Furthermore, our quote-accepting and clearing strategies (see Sub-
sections 2.1 and 2.2) are proved to be very effective, with the TSR
increasing from 0.92 at the beginning of the game to over 0.99 after
150 days, outperforming that of all the other agents.
3.2 Intra-Marginal and Extra-marginal Traders
We observe in Figures 2 and 3 that the ratio of intra-marginal traders
registered with IAMwildCAT converges to 0:9 (which is consider-
ably higher than that of the other agents). This suggests that our agent
successfully incentivises intra-marginal traders to join its market,
driving away extra-marginal ones. This is done through setting the
fees appropriately (see the charging policy in Subsection 2.4) such
that extra-marginal traders, which are not expected to trade, would
make negative proﬁt by being charged a registration fee. A market
with more intra-marginal traders would imply better bids and asks
that can be cleared, which improves our TSR in the process. Now,
10 We repeat each game for 15 runs to improve our estimate of performance.
11 Becausethe limitprices aredrawn froma uniformdistribution, thedemand
and supply curves are expected to be linear, intersecting at 100.
12 A trader is globally intra-marginal if it is intra-marginal when we consider
all traders in the system. In our experiments, buyers (resp. sellers) are ex-
pected to be intra-marginal if their limit prices are at least higher (resp.
lower) than the theoretical equilibrium price at 100.
Figure 2. Percentage of intra-marginal buyers.
Figure 3. Percentage of intra-marginal sellers.
the intuition behind this ratio capping at around 0:9 is that given the
trader’s selection strategy, there is a probability of 0:1 that a trader,
whether it is intra-marginal or extra-marginal, randomly selects a
specialist. Thus, there is always a chance that extra-marginal traders
will register with a specialist, such that the ratio can never be 1.
3.3 Discriminatory Versus Side-Biased Pricing
We next evaluate our side-biased pricing policy (where we vary the
k parameter); we considered an experiment with 7 different agents,
including IAMwildCAT (with this policy) and a modiﬁed version
of IAMwildCAT, which used the ﬁxed discriminatory k-pricing pol-
icy. We believe it is necessary to vary k because intra-marginal
traders in a specialist’s market might not necessarily be globally
intra-marginal.Thus,givenouraimtoincentiviseonlyintra-marginal
traders to join our market, we vary k to give more proﬁt to globally
intra-marginal traders than to globally extra-marginal ones. Here, we
analyse the effect of side-biased pricing on our strategy.
Now, from Figure 4, we observe that our side-biased pricing pol-
icy does increase our ratio of intra-marginal sellers to intra-marginal
buyers in the market. However, it introduces a small bias for sellers
with more intra-marginal sellers than intra-marginal buyers. It is also
interesting to note that IAMwildCAT has a ratio of globally intra-
marginal sellers to buyers stable around 1 compared to the hugely
varying one of the other agents. This is indeed effective behaviour as
a ratio that deviates from 1 implies an equilibrium price that is higher
or lower than the theoretical equilibrium in the global market such
that some of the proﬁts are distributed to globally extra-marginalFigure 4. Ratio of intra-marginal buyers to sellers.
Figure 5. Market share with discriminatory and side-biased pricing.
traders at the expense of globally intra-marginal ones. While the pric-
ing does not affect the specialist’s proﬁt share (but rather the distribu-
tion of proﬁts among buyers and sellers) or its TSR, we can see from
Figure5thatourside-biasedpricingisanimprovementovertheﬁxed
discriminatory pricing, since it does increase the market share.
3.4 Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Markets
Finally, as per previous evaluation methodologies of double auctions
[10, 2], we analyse the global efﬁciency (and the convergence of the
daily market efﬁciency) of the strategies in both homogeneous and
heterogeneous settings. Now, if agents were allowed to select their
strategy, they would all chose the most efﬁcient one, i.e. IAMwild-
CAT, and it would then be very insightful to see how the market
efﬁciency changes if all agents use the same strategy. In particular,
in a homogeneous setting, IAMwildCAT does better than in the het-
erogeneous setting, with a global efﬁciency of 90.6% (see Figure 6).
While PersianCAT has the highest global efﬁciency (slightly higher
than IAMwildCAT at 90.9%), it does poorly in the heterogeneous
environment where it scores 128.8, i.e. 47% less than IAMwildCAT.
PersianCATperformswellinthehomogeneouscasebecauseitsstrat-
egy favours proﬁt-maximisation (sacriﬁcing its TSR) that contributes
to the high efﬁciency. Thus, overall, IAMwildCAT performs well in
both a homogeneous (with a high global market efﬁciency) and a
heterogeneous environment (with a high score).
4 Conclusions
This paper details the IAMwildCAT agent, winner of the 2007 TAC
Market Design Competition. In particular, we presented the trade-
Experiment Global Efﬁciency Convergence Coefﬁcient
6 PersianCATS 90.9% 8.1
6 IAMwildCATS 90.6% 6.2
6 Heterogeneous CATS 88.7% 6.4
6 CorcodileAgents 79.8% 6.1
Figure 6. Efﬁciency of homogeneous and heterogeneous markets.
offs present in the design of the agent and gave our strategic rules
for quote-accepting, clearing, pricing and charging. We analysed the
competition results and, in particular, the IAMwildCAT agent’s mar-
ket share, proﬁt share and transaction success rate compared to the
other agents. We then looked at how IAMwildCAT is very successful
atincentivisingintra-marginaltraderstojoinitsmarket,drivingaway
extra-marginal ones. Furthermore, we examined experimentally the
advantage of our side-biased pricing over the standard ﬁxed discrim-
inatory pricing and showed that our agent is able to balance the num-
ber of globally intra-marginal buyers and sellers which avoids dis-
tributing proﬁts to undesirable, extra-marginal traders. Finally, we
analysed the strategies outside the scope of the competition by look-
ing at the market efﬁciency in homogeneous and heterogeneous en-
vironments. As discussed in Subsection 3.4, such insights are partic-
ularly important if agents are allowed to change strategies and they
all choose the most efﬁcient one. We empirically demonstrated that a
market with only IAMwildCAT agents does reasonably well at only
0.3% less than the most efﬁcient one, PersianCAT, while outperform-
ing the heterogeneous market in terms of market efﬁciency.
As future work, we intend to improve on all the policies we cur-
rently have. For example, we intend to improve our charging policy,
by better understanding how the different fees individually affect the
market share and proﬁt share. This would allow us to experiment
with various combinations of strategies (like in [9]) and select the
best combination, so as to improve our agent even more. As such
strategies are designed to be more and more effective, they will be
the foundations for automating real markets in a global economy.
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